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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the hypothesis that higher federal budget 
deficits act to increase the degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S. Using annual data on aggregate personal income 
tax evasion for the period 1961-1997, 1997 being the most recent 
year for which all of the needed data are currently available, and 
allowing for such factors as income tax rates, IRS tax return 
audit rates, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, it is 
found that income tax evasion is an increasing function of the 
budget deficit. Important policy implications of this finding are 
provided in the Conclusion.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Income tax evasion effectively consists of taxable income 
that is either unreported or underreported to the government tax 
collection agency, which is the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) for 
the case of the U.S. Studies of income tax evasion behavior 
essentially fall into three categories. First, there are the 
principally theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, such as 
Falkinger (1988), Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Klepper, Nagin, and 
Spurr (1991), Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky 
(1994), and Caballe and Panades (1997). Second, there are a number 
of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or (b) undertake 
experiments, such as Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Friedland 
(1982), Spicer and Thomas (1982), Benjamini and Maital (1985), 
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Alm, Jackson, and McGee (1992), Baldry (1987), De Juan (1989), 
Thurman (1991), and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999). Third, 
are those studies that use what is referred to as "official data" 
[e.g., Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod (1985), Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann (1989), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Feige (1994), Cebula 
(1997; 2001), and Feinstein (1999).  
 It is widely believed that the "degree of federal (central 
government) personal income tax evasion in the economy as a whole" 
(hereafter, "DTE") is positively affected by income tax rates 
[Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod (1985), Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 
(1989), Feige (1994), Cebula (1997; 2001), Saltz (2001)]. 
Allegedly, the higher the income tax rate, the greater the benefit 
(in terms of a reduced tax liability) from not reporting taxable 
income, ceteris paribus. It is also widely accepted that the 
greater the risk associated with underreporting or not reporting 
income, the less the degree to which economic agents will choose 
either to not report or to underreport their taxable income 
[Friedland (1982), Spicer and Thomas (1985), De Juan (1989), Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee (1992), Errard and Feinstein (1994), Cebula 
(1997; 2001), Saltz (2001)].  
 This study seeks to add to the third category of this rich 
literature by investigating whether federal budget deficits in the 
U.S. impact on the incentive to evade income taxation. The U.S. 
federal budget was in surplus for the period FY1998-FY2001.  
However, given the recession of 2001, a sluggish economy following 
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that recession, tax cut legislation enacted in 2001, the “war on 
terrorism” declared in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and the tax cut statute enacted in 2003, 
federal budget deficits have reappeared. Krueger (2003) warns that 
federal budget deficits have re-emerged as a major problem and 
that that with the impending retirement of the first “baby 
boomers,” the “red ink” is likely to continue “as far as the eye 
can see.” Similarly, Comptroller General David Walker (2003, p. 
A12) has observed that “The days of surpluses are gone, and our 
current and projected budget situation has worsened 
significantly.” Walker (2003, p. A12) adds that “The bottom line 
is, there is little question that deficits matter, especially if 
they are large, structural, and recurring in nature…” Indeed, 
Krueger (2003) envisions predicted future budget deficits as 
raising interest rates and crowding out private investment in new 
plant and equipment in years to come.  
Krueger’s concerns are not uncommon. Over the years, a number 
of economists and policymakers have taken the view that, among 
other things, budget deficits raise interest rates. For example, 
consider another distinguished economist, Michael Boskin (1987, p. 
257), who has stated that “…it is very likely that deficits do 
contribute to high interest rates both directly through increased 
demand in credit markets and indirectly through uncertainty premia 
over their likely economic effects and how they will be resolved…” 
Moreover, to the extent that government budget deficits act to 
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raise intermediate and long term interest rates, it has previously 
been suggested that deficits lead to the crowding out of 
investment [Al-Saji (1992; 1993), Carlson and Spencer (1975), 
Cebula (1991)]. Indeed, the budget deficit issue is very much 
alive, as are the concerns over its potential effects on the 
economic future of the U.S. economy. The very recent scholarly 
contributions by Ott (2003), MacAvoy (2003), and Orcutt (2003) are 
evidence of this. 
The present study, however, considers budget deficits from a 
different and perhaps less obvious (but no less dangerous) 
perspective, namely, “Do higher budget deficits themselves lead to 
increased tax evasion?” If the answer to this question is indeed 
“yes,” then government budget deficits may be to some extent self-
generating, implying that the need to have federal government 
budgetary restraint (fiscal responsibility) may be even greater 
than heretofore perceived or conceded. Section II of this study 
provides the basic model and identifies formally the key variables 
in the system; in so doing, the formal hypothesis surrounding the 
potential budget deficit/tax evasion linkage is provided. The 
subsequent section describes the data used to test the model and 
provides the empirical findings. A summary and policy implications 
are found in the concluding section.  
II. THE MODEL 
 The economy consists of agents who generate economic value 
that is reflected in the form of taxable income. These economic 
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agents choose whether or not to report none, some, or all of their 
taxable income to the IRS. To the extent that said income is 
reported to the IRS, a tax liability may be incurred. 
 In this study, the relative probability that the 
representative economic agent will not report his/her taxable 
income to the IRS is treated as an increasing function of the 
expected gross benefits to the agent of not reporting income, eb, 
and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the agent 
of not reporting income, ec. Thus, it is hypothesized that, to 
some degree paralleling the model in Cebula (2001), the 
probability of not reporting income to the IRS, pnr, is described 
for the representative economic agent by: 
pnr = f(eb, ec), feb > 0, fec < 0     (1)  
Since the values for pnr will vary across different sectors of the 
economy, pnr may be viewed as a weighted average of these various 
probabilities.  
 The gross benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are 
expected to be an increasing function of the federal personal 
income tax rate [Cagan (1958), Bawley (1982), Tanzi (1982; 1983), 
Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod (1985), Pyle (1989), Feige (1994)]. To 
reflect the federal personal income tax rate, most previous 
studies using official data have adopted either of two alternative 
measures: an average effective personal income tax rate (AEPT) or 
the maximum marginal personal income tax rate (MAXPT). In this 
study, unlike most of the previous related studies, both of these 
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measures are adopted simultaneously. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesized that: 
eb = g(AEPT, MAXPT), gAEPT > 0, gMAXPT > 0    (2) 
It has previously been suggested [Feige(1994), Cebula (2001)] 
that the more the public distrusts and resents government policies 
and how government officials conduct themselves, the greater may 
be the subjective benefits taxpayers derive from tax evasion. For 
example, it has been specifically argued by Feige (1994, p. 129) 
that the public's dissatisfaction with government and hence its 
penchant for income tax evasion may have been increased by factors 
such as “…the Vietnam War and the subsequent Watergate episode and 
sharply rising tax [income] rates.”                 
Based on Feige (1994, p. 129) then, it is first hypothesized 
here that there would have been an increase in personal income tax 
evasion, ceteris paribus, as a taxpayer response over the years of 
the Nixon/Nixon-Ford Administrations (1972-1976, which period is 
represented here by the dummy variable WATERGATE) during which the 
actual Watergate scandal occurred and was serving as the subject 
of nearly constant media attention. In addition, a second dummy 
variable reflecting the Watergate scandal is considered in the 
analysis, AFTERWATER. This binary variable is included in the 
analysis in order to test whether there was a longer term taxpayer 
reaction in the period that followed the Watergate scandal, one in 
which a taxpayer attitude of resisting (trying to evade) federal 
personal income taxation was greater due to a continuing, 
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generally diminished faith in the U.S. political system and/or 
politicians. Also following Feige (1994, p. 129), we hypothesize 
an adverse taxpayer reaction to the Vietnam War in the form of 
increased personal income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. This study 
allows for this phenomenon by including a separate dummy variable 
(WAR) for the years (1965-1972) during which the U.S. was 
significantly involved in Vietnam militarily, i.e., not merely or 
primarily in an “advisory” capacity. Accordingly, equation (2) can 
now be expanded to:   
eb = h(AEPT, MAXPT, WAR, WATERGATE, AFTERWATER), 
hAEPT > 0, hMAXPT > 0, hWAR > 0, hWATERGATE > 0, hAFTERWATER > 0  (2') 
 In addition, it is hypothesized in the present study that the 
public’s dissatisfaction with government may be significantly 
impacted by the size of federal budget deficits (DEF). Such 
deficits may be viewed as wasteful, fiscally irresponsible, and 
indeed even unfair, the latter in part because households in 
general must as a rule in the long run live within budget 
constraints, whereas the federal government effectively faces no 
such constraint whatsoever. Moreover, the burden of the interest 
paid on federal deficits is borne principally by individual 
taxpayers through their federal personal income tax payments, a 
potential cause for further dissatisfaction with government 
deficits. Thus, taxpayers not only are by nature deprived of the 
financial (budgetary) freedom the federal government enjoys but 
also must foot the bill for the federal government’s “budgetary 
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transgressions.” Furthermore, to the extent that at least some 
portion of the income-earning public believes that budget deficits 
adversely affect the economy [see, e.g., Krueger (2003)], federal 
deficits may further contribute to the public’s dissatisfaction 
with government. Thus, it is hypothesized here that the greater 
the size of the federal budget deficit, the greater the degree of 
taxpayer dissatisfaction with government and hence the greater the 
degree to which taxpayers have a desire to underreport or not 
report income to the IRS, ceteris paribus. Hence, (2’) can be 
rewritten as: 
eb= h (AEPT, MAXPT, WAR, WATERGATE, AFTERWATER, DEF), hAEPT > 0, 
hMAXPT > 0, hWAR > 0, hWATERGATE >0, hAFTERWATER > 0, hDEF > 0  (2”) 
 The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS 
are hypothesized to be an increasing function of the risks thereof 
[Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992), Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky 
(1994), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Caballe and Panades (1997), 
Cebula (1997), Saltz (2001)]. In this study, to the representative 
economic agent, the expected penalty from not reporting or 
underreporting taxable income to the IRS, is enhanced by an 
increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal income tax 
returns that is formally audited by IRS examiners/personnel. 
Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax audit would imply non-
pecuniary ("psychic") costs as well as pecuniary costs (including 
outlays for legal or other representation, along with the value of 
one's own time) above and beyond any potential added taxes, 
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penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. Thus, we have: 
 ec = j(AUDIT), jAUDIT > 0           (3) 
Substituting from (2”) and (3) into (1) yields:  
pnr = b(AEPT, MAXPT, WAR, WATERGATE, AFTERWATER, DEF, AUDIT),  
bAEPT >0,bMAXPT >0,bWAR >0,bWATERGATE >0,bAFTERWATER >0,bDEF >0,bAUDIT <0  (4)  
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the framework provided in (4) above, the following 
reduced-form equation is to be estimated: 
(AURI/GDP)t = a0 + a1 AEPTt-1 + a2 MAXPTt-1 + a3 WARt 
+ a4 WATERGATEt + a5 AFTERWATERt + a6 DEFYt + a7 AUDITt-1 + u (5)  
where:  
(AURI/GDP)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported taxable 
income in year t to the GDP in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
AEPTt-1 = the average effective federal personal income tax rate in 
year t-1, expressed as a percent;1 
MAXPTt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in 
year t-1, expressed as a percent; 
WARt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years in which the U.S. 
was significantly and actively involved militarily in the Vietnam 
War: WARt = 1 for 1965-1972 and WARt = 0, otherwise; 
WATERGATEt = a binary variable for the years surrounding the 
Watergate scandal, beginning with 1972, when the Watergate break-
in was discovered and made public and ending with 1976, when the 
Nixon/Nixon-Ford Administrations were effectively over:  
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WATERGATEt = 1 for 1972-1976 and = 0 otherwise;  
AFTERWATERt = a binary variable for the years subsequent to 1976: 
AFTERWATERt = 1 for years prior to 1977 and = 0 for 1977 and 
thereafter; 
DEFYt = the ratio of the total nominal federal budget deficit in 
year t to the nominal GDP in year t, expressed as a percent; 
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax 
returns in year t-1 that was subjected to a formal IRS audit 
involving IRS examiners; 
u = stochastic error term. 
The study period runs from 1961 through 1997, a time frame 
dictated by availability of all of the needed data. For example, 
quality data for the variable AUDIT are not available on a 
reliable basis prior to 1960, and the tax evasion series have not 
as yet been computed past 1997. The data are annual. The data for 
AEPT, MAXPT, and AUDIT were obtained from the IRS (1960-1997) and 
the IRS (2003). The WAR, AFTERWATER, and WATERGATE variables are 
binary (dummy) variables. The DEFY variable was obtained from the 
Council of Economic Advisors (2003, Table B-79), after multiplying 
the series by (-1). As is common practice in the empirical 
macroeconomics literature, the budget deficit is expressed 
relative to the size of the economy. The series adopted to measure 
the variable AURI/GDP were obtained from Tanzi(1982; 1983) and 
extended through 1997. The mean value for the AURI/GDP series was 
4.89, with a standard deviation of +0.559. 
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The P-P (Phillips-Peron) unit root test indicates that the 
variables AURI/GDP and AEPT are both stationary in levels, whereas 
the variables MAXPT, DEFY, and AUDIT are stationary only in first 
differences. Accordingly, in the estimations, the variables MAXPT, 
DEFY, and AUDIT are expressed in first differences. 
 The variables (AURI/GDP)t and DEFYt are contemporaneous. To 
avoid simultaneity bias, an IV (instrumental variables) approach 
is adopted. The instrument adopted is the two-year lag of the 
annual percentage interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes 
(TEN). The P-P test reveals that, like the DEFY variable, the TEN 
variable is stationary only in first differences. The choice of 
instrument is based on the finding that the DEFY variable (in 
first differences) and the two-year lagged TEN variable (in first 
differences) are highly correlated, whereas the two-year lagged 
instrument is not correlated with the error terms in the system. 
The data for TEN were obtained from the Council of Economic 
Advisors (2003, Table B-73). 
 The IV estimation of equation (5), adopting the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity correction, is provided in equation (10): 
(AURI/GDP)t = 2.08 + 0.15 AEPTt-1 + 0.015 zMAXPTt-1 + 0.29 WARt 
         (+2.86)       (+2.18)     (+2.54) 
+ 0.73 WATERGATEt + 0.19 zDEFYt + 1.1 AFTERWATERt 
(+5.18)    (+2.68)   (+7.85) 
-0.29 zAUDITt-1, F-statistic = 15.03, DW = 1.95, Rho= 0.02  (6) 
(-1.32) 
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where terms in parentheses are t-values and z is the first-
differences operator. 
 In equation (6), all of the estimated coefficients on the 
seven explanatory variables exhibit the hypothesized signs, with  
six statistically significant at beyond the five percent level. 
The F-statistic is significant at far beyond the one percent 
level. There is no concern regarding autocorrelation. 
 The estimated coefficient on the AEPT variable is positive 
and significant at the one percent level. Thus, the greater the 
average effective federal personal income tax rate, the greater 
the aggregate degree of income tax evasion by households. This 
finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and with 
several previous studies, e.g., Clotfelder (1983), Slemrod (1985), 
Feige (1994), and Cebula (2001). The coefficient on the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate is positive and 
significant at the four percent level. Thus, there is strong 
evidence that this particular measure of the federal personal 
income tax rate also positively affects tax evasion. The estimated 
coefficients on the WAR, AFTERWATER, and WATERGATE dummies are all 
positive and statistically significant at beyond the two percent 
level. Thus, it appears, as argued by Feige (1994), that the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal may have acted to create an 
attitude among taxpayers that increased the degree of their 
personal income tax evasion. By contrast, the estimated 
coefficient on the AUDIT variable is negative but not 
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statistically significant, a finding consistent with the earlier 
studies by Cebula (1997) and Saltz (2001). Finally, the estimated 
coefficient on the deficit variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Thus, it appears, as 
hypothesized in this study, that for the U.S. the greater the 
federal budget deficit (expressed here as a percent of GDP), the 
greater the degree to which taxpayers engage in income tax 
evasion.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 This study has examined the hypothesis that, at least for the 
U.S., larger federal budget deficits create an incentive for 
resentful taxpayers to engage in a greater degree of federal 
personal income tax evasion. This potential impact of the federal 
budget deficit has not to date been formally investigated in the 
published literature.  
The IV estimate reveals several conclusions. For example, the 
aggregate degree of personal federal income tax evasion over the 
1961-1997 study period was an increasing function of the average 
effective federal personal income tax rate, the maximum marginal 
personal income tax rate, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate 
scandal.  
Strong empirical evidence is also provided that the greater 
the federal budget deficit (measured in this study as a percent of 
the GDP), the greater the degree of personal federal income tax 
evasion. If this finding is valid, it implies that the greater the 
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federal budget deficit (relative to the size of the economy), the 
lower the Treasury’s income tax revenues will be over time and 
hence the higher future federal budget deficits will become over 
time, ceteris paribus. Thus, a hidden danger in the recent 
reappearance of huge budget deficits is that future projections of 
those deficits may prove to be more downwards biased than 
previously believed. Given the potential long term implications of 
huge budget deficits for interest rates, capital formation, 
economic growth, global economic competitiveness, and living 
standards, the economic impacts of prolonged huge budget deficits 
could be traumatic to the U.S. economic outlook.  
 
Endnote 
 1. Feige (1994, p. 135) states that "The average tax rate is 
simply the sum of total government tax receipts divided by AGI 
[aggregate]," where AGI is adjusted gross income. In the present 
investigation, variable AEPT is total federal government income 
tax receipts from individuals divided by their aggregate AGI. 
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